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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
The State charged Mr. Beeks with felony violation of a no contact order based 
upon the allegation that Mr. Beeks had been convicted twice for prior violations of no 
contact orders in the past five years. Mr. Beeks was convicted of felony violation of a 
no contact order following a jury trial. 
Mr. Beeks timely appeals from his judgment of conviction and sentence. On 
appeal, he asserts that the district court erred in instructing the jury. Specifically, he 
contends that the district court should have instructed the jury as to the union of act and 
intent requirement, and that acts or omissions committed through misfortune or 
accident, and with no evil design, intention or culpable negligence, are not criminal. 
Mr. Beeks also contends that the State engaged in several instances of misconduct 
during his trial, which occurred during voir dire and closing statements. The prosecutor 
told the jury several times that there was additional information that he was not allowed 
to tell them, and later told the jury he was not allowed to introduce evidence of 
Mr. Beeks' prior domestic assault or domestic battery charge. Although the 
prosecutorial misconduct was not objected to, Mr. Beeks asserts that it amounted to 
fundamental error and, therefore, can be considered on appeal. The misconduct 
violated Mr. Beeks' right to a fair trial and due process. 
This Reply Brief is necessary to address the State's contention that the district 
court did not err in instructing the jury. 
1 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedin s 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Beeks' Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are 
incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
2 
ISSUES 
1. Did the district court err by failing to instruct the jury on the necessary intent 
element of the crime, and by refusing to instruct the jury that acts or omissions 
committed through misfortune or accident, and with no evil design, intention or 
culpable negligence, are not criminal? 
2. Did the State commit prosecutorial misconduct rising to the level of fundamental 
error when it elicited testimony regarding the existence of two no contact orders, 
and when it repeatedly told the jury that there was additional information that the 
prosecutor was not allowed to tell the jury, including that Mr. Beeks had 
previously been charged with either domestic assault or domestic battery?1 
1 Analysis of the prosecutorial misconduct issue was fully addressed in Mr. Beeks' 
Appellant's Brief and will not be further discussed herein. 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred By Failing To Instruct The Ju I As To The Intent Element Of 
The Offense, And By Refusing To Instruct The Jury That Acts Or Omissions Committed 
Through Misfortune Or Accident Are Not Criminal 
In Idaho, all crimes require a union of act and intent. In this case the jury was 
never instructed as to this requirement. Such was error. 
The State claims that there was "no reasonable view of the evidence that would 
require a 'union of act and intent' instruction." (Respondent's Brief, p.10.) The State 
also represents that State v. Fox, 124 Idaho 924 (1993), stands for the proposition that 
"where the criminal statute does not set forth any mental state as an element of the 
statute, 'the intention with which the act is done, or the lack of criminal intent in the 
premises, is immaterial."' (Respondent's Brief, p.9.) However, the State's 
representation of the holding in Fox is inaccurate. The Idaho Supreme Court actually 
held in Fox that because the statutory definition of possession of a controlled substance 
does not expressly require any mental element, and I.C. § 18-114 only requires a joint 
union of act and general intent, possession of a controlled substance is a general intent 
crime, i.e., the knowledge that one is in possession of the substance meets the intent 
element. Fox, 124 Idaho at 926. 
In Idaho, conviction for a criminal offense requires the jury to find a requisite state 
of mind. State v. Macias, 142 Idaho 509 (Ct. App. 2005). In Macias, the Idaho Court of 
Appeals held that a misfortune or accident defense jury instruction was proper, but not 
required, in a battery prosecution because the jury had already been instructed on the 
requisite state of mind element by way of the jury instructions on: (1) the elements of 
battery, (2) willful acts, and (3) the requirement of union or joint operation of act and 
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intent. Id. at 511. The Court in Macias held that the subject matter of the requested 
instruction was sufficiently covered by the instructions actually given to the jury. Id. 
In this case, the jury was never instructed as to the requisite state of mind 
element. Idaho Code Section 18-114 requires that for every crime, "there must exist a 
union or joint operation, of act and intent, or criminal negligence." The intent required 
by I. C. § 18-920 is not the intent to commit a crime but is merely the intent to perform 
the interdicted act, or by criminal negligence, the failure to perform the required act. Id. 
Therefore, a violation of I.C. § 18-920 requires general intent; namely, that a person 
with a domestic assault or domestic battery charge or conviction, after having been 
notified of the existence of a no contact order, intentionally had contact with the person 
he was prohibited from contacting, not that he or she intended to commit a crime. 
Here, the only instruction specific to the offense was the general elements 
instruction. (R., p.350.) Notably, unlike in Macias, in Mr. Beeks' case, the requirement 
of union or joint operation of act and intent instruction was not given, and the elements 
instruction did not specify what intent was necessary to find Mr. Beeks guilty. 
(R., p.350.) Thus the jury in this case was never instructed as to the mens rea of the 
offense. This was error, particularly where the primary contested issue during the trial 
was whether Mr. Beeks violated the no contact order by accident, where Ms. Murillo 
took multiple steps to facilitate the contact and mislead Mr. Beeks about the status of 
the no contact order. Thus, the jury was not properly instructed. 
At trial, one of the facts in dispute was whether Mr. Beeks attended the video visit 
believing either that he was not going to be speaking to Ms. Murillo, as his visitor was 
identified as "John Lawrence," or that the no contact order had been dropped. (Trial 
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Tr., p.16, L.23 - p.17, L.10; State's Trial Exhibit 1.) Where the facts of Mr. Beeks' case 
seriously call into question whether Mr. Beeks had any intent to participate in a jail visit 
with Ms. Murillo, it was error for the district court not to instruct the jury on the 
requirement that there be a union of act and intent. 
The district court further erred in refusing to instruct the jury on culpability for acts 
or omissions committed through misfortune or accident, where the evidence adduced at 
trial supported giving such an instruction and Mr. Beeks requested such an instruction. 
The State disputes Mr. Beeks' claim of error as to the district court's refusal to 
give his requested instruction on "misfortune or accident." (Respondent's Brief, pp:11-
13.) The State claims t11at it is not a reasonable vievlf of the evidence that Mr. Beeks 
accidentally spoke with Ms. Murillo. (Respondent's Brief, p.12.) However, this is 
inaccurate. 
Whether a jury was properly instructed is a question of law over which the 
appellate court exercises free review. State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 710 (2009). A 
trial court must instruct the jury on "all matters of law necessary for their information." 
I.C. § 19-2132(a). A requested jury instruction must be given if: (1) it properly states 
the governing law; (2) a reasonable view of at least some evidence would support the 
defendant's legal theory; (3) the subject of the requested instruction is not adequately 
addressed by other jury instructions; and (4) the requested instruction does not 
constitute an impermissible comment on the evidence. Macias, 142 Idaho at 510. 
First, the State concedes that the requested instruction properly stated the 
governing law, and since the requested instruction was a pattern jury instruction, Idaho 
Criminal Jury Instruction 1508, it is presumptively correct. McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 
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5(37, 571 n.2 (2010). Second, a reasonable view of the evidence supported Mr. Beeks' 
theory of the case. Evidence was adduced at trial which demonstrated that Mr. Beeks 
took steps to avoid contact with Ms. Murillo. Specifically, the video presented at trial 
clearly contains a series of questions from Mr. Beeks to Ms. Murillo regarding whether it 
was "okay to talk", i.e., whether the no contact order was still in place. (State's Trial 
Exhibit 1.) Further, it appeared that Mr. Beeks was being cautious and trying to obey 
the terms of the no contact order and that he appeared ready to leave the room in order 
to obey the law. (State's Trial Exhibit 1.) Ultimately, he only remained in the video visit 
room in reliance on Ms. Murillo's representation that it was okay to talk. (State's Trial 
Exhibit 1.) The evidence presented by the defense was enough for the district court to 
find that defense counsel could argue (without the requested instruction) that Mr. Beeks' 
contact with Ms. Murillo was inadvertent or an accident. (Supp. Trial Tr., p.79, L.19 -
p.80, L. 7, p.80, L.24 - p.82, L.5.) This indicates an understanding by the district court 
that the facts of the case supported such an argument. Thus, the district court's 
unwillingness to instruct the jury as to a misfortunate event or accident was error where 
Mr. Beeks requested the instruction, and the district court implicitly acknowledged that 
defense counsel could make a feasible argument that the contact was accidental. The 
evidence adduced at trial demonstrated that Mr. Beeks' contact with Ms. Murillo was 
either purely accidental or based on a mistaken belief that she had the no contact order 
lifted. Thus, the giving of such an instruction would not have constituted an 
impermissible comment on the evidence. Additionally, the subject of the requested jury 
instruction was not adequately addressed by the other jury instructions. 
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The facts of this case are somewhat similar to the facts in a recent Idaho Court of 
Appeals decision, State v. Hopkins, Idaho __ , 345 P.3d 250 (20·15), in which the 
Court held that the trial court erred in denying the defense's requested jury instruction 
on defense of accident and such error was not harmless. In Hopkins, the defendant 
had slammed a courtroom door hard enough to damage the wall behind it and was 
subsequently charged with malicious injury to property. Id. at 252-53. The defendant 
testified that she did not intend to damage the wall, and she did not know she had done 
so until an officer called her at home. Id. at 253. Although the defense requested that 
the jury be instructed as to the defense of accident, the trial court denied the request, 
and the jury convicted the defendant. Id. at 253-54. The Court of Appeals reversed the 
conviction, finding that a malicious injury to property conviction required the State to 
prove that the defendant intentionally injured the property. Hopkins, 245 P.3d at 256. 
The instructions given in the case precluded the defense the defendant wished to 
advance-that her act in damaging the property was an accident, or unintentional. Id. 
Because the other jury instructions did not adequately cover the issue of the requisite 
mental element, and the requested instruction would have informed the jury of this 
defense, the trial court erred in refusing to give the accident instruction. Id. at 257. The 
Court of Appeals found the error was not harmless where the defense presented 
evidence that the defendant did not intend to damage the wall, and noted that the 
evidence presented was sufficient for the trial court to indicate its belief that the 
defendant did not intend to damage the wall. Id. 
As discussed above, the intent necessary for a conviction of violation of a no 
contact order was not explained by the jury instructions, and an instruction on the 
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requirement of union or joint operation of act and intent was absent. As such, the 
absence of the union of act and intent instruction, in addition to the district court's 
refusal to give the requested accident instruction, left the jury without any guidance as 
to the mens rea of the crime. Where the other jury instructions did not adequately cover 
the issue of the requisite mental element, and the requested instruction would have 
informed the jury of this defense, the trial court erred in refusing to give the accident 
instruction. See Hopkins, 345 P.3d at 257. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Beeks respectfully requests that this Court vacate 
his judgment of conviction and remand his case for a new trial. 
DATED this 30th day of April, 2015. 
. / 
c/( j \ 
j 
SALLY J. COOLE~ 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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